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Abstract 
This paper argues that there is ‘ownership gap’ in the design and implementation of monetized fringe benefits in 
Nigeria’s public sector. It attributes the gap to alienation of the people in the public sector as well as the failure 
of government to recognize the self interest factor of individuals at the introduction of the reform regime. 
Accordingly the paper notes that this caused the inability of the reform to significantly reduce waste, corruption 
and failed to promote efficiency and accountability in publi
the public choice theory derived from new public management framework to explain the relationship between 
self interest and the challenges of monetization regime in the public sector. However in conclusi
links the decadence in public service amidst the reform agenda to the factor it describes as a “reform without 
people” and recommends that Nigerian government should consider the option of learning from private sector 
organizations that have successfully applied the principles of monetization of fringe benefits of their personnel. 
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1. Introduction 
Nigeria as a multi-ethnic state with strong religious divide is politic
identity differences. These have accentuated struggle for personal satisfaction and by extension providing for 
identity allies in virtually all aspects public endeavour in Nigeria. The public service is not exempte
politics of self interest.  
The history of public service in Nigeria reflects strive for private and sectional gains among the operators 
(public servants) against the background that it is designed to serve public interest. While this is traced
colonial, military and civilian administrative influences, the aspiration is that governments and administrations 
should use the public service as apparatus of government to improve organizational performance. The success in 
this regard reflects contributions to improve education, health, roads and transport systems, and modernization of 
telecommunication systems. All these and many more are made possible in part by the activities of their public 
administrations. (Nnoli 2003:249) 
Aside from these, much still remains to be accomplished resulting from the decline in honesty and integrity 
of personnel in public sector. Obviously, therefore, the reason is the struggle for personal advantage within 
Nigeria’s public administration orchestrated by ethnic and po
self accounting in public service. The concomitant of this, manifest in poor work ethics where average public 
officer puts self above public service and works to exploits the system instead of embracing t
passion. 
As recourse to these afflictions, Nigerian government introduced the monetization of fringe benefits as a 
reform agenda to reinvent the public interest by public servant. This therefore brings us to understanding the 
concept of ‘monetization’ and ‘fringe benefits’ as used in this study.In the 
of Nigeria on ‘monetisation of fringe benefits’, it states that, ‘monetisation’ is the “quantification in money terms 
of those fringe benefits which government 
service”(FGN,2002:10).Furthermore, Onu (2006:275) explains monetisation as “the process of converting fringe 
benefits attached to workers salaries into cash incentives. The cash incentives are 
instalment depending on the financial strength of the paying body”. 
On the other hand, fringe benefits as put by McConnell (1987) are the rewards other than wages that 
employees receive from their employers and which include pens
vacations and sick leaves. In the related views of, W.G. Nickels, J.M McHugh and Susan M (1999) fringe 
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benefits are benefits such as sick leave pay, vacation pay, pension’s plans, and health plans that represent 
additional compensation to employees beyond bare wage.
These benefits were provided by government of Nigeria until 2002,when the then president ,Olusegun 
Obasanjo introduced the monetization of fringe benefits in public service. This becomes interesting espec
and for the fact that the reform is introduced to enable government;
(i) get the true pictures of what it costs to maintain a political office holder or public servant and 
therefore lead to a more realistic planning, budgeting and budget implementation. 
(ii) enhance fiscal discipline which positively impact on the national value systems and ethics.
(iii) put corruption on check thereby enhancing efficiency in the public service 
(iv) ensure equity in the allocation of scarce resources 
(v) to help public officers to develop
public utilities.( The Federal Government of Nigeria policy document (2002:15) on monetization of 
fringe benefits) 
These objectives are very laudable and will no doubt improve public servic
organization that practice monetization of fringe benefits. However its practice in Nigeria’s public service for the 
past twelve years has left so much to desire due to abysmal failure of the reform to significantly contri
improvement in the workings of public sector. One of identified gaps in this regards is lack of ownership in the 
reform process by policymaking institution, personnel and beneficiaries. It is therefore within this context that 
the paper sets to examine  implications of  ‘ownership gap’ in implementing monetization of fringe benefits in 
the Nigeria’s public sector. Let us at juncture discuss the technique of this study.
 
2. Methodology 
The methodology for gathering information in this study revol
the review of books, journals, government reports and other literatures. The use of this technique is necessary, 
for the reason that it is assumed that the documented and published work is quite reliable 
2.1  Theoretical Explanation 
Choices in the public sector are a matter of locating problems of market failure, determining the efficient 
solution, and finding ways to achieve it. This is the concern of Federal Government of Nigeria when it 
introduced monetization of fringe benefits due to public and civil servants .While the concern lasts, the 
perceptions and dispositions of the targeted personnel poise the challenge of satisfying individual needs. It is 
upon this understanding that the publ
and people in public as they interface in the monetization regime
engage in rent-seeking behavior by pursuing their self
continue to try to maximize utility or profit. Public choice theory discards the notion that people in the public 
sector seek to maximize net benefits to society as a whole. Rather, it assumes that each particip
sector seeks to maximize his or her own utility. 
This theory is derived from new public management (NPM),which  traces its roots to early 1990’s in 
United States of America as a criticism of traditional approach that promotes and primari
rather than achieving results. In the words of Rosenbloom and Kravchuk (2002:21) NPM “starts from the 
premise that traditional, bureaucratically organized public administration is “broke” and “broken” and 
consequently the public has lost faith in government”. Upon this assumption ,public choice theory argues against 
the background individual self interest to opine that for people in public sector to achieve the objectives of 
satisfying the society, there is need for external oversight
that which focuses on internal managerial matters, including spending, personnel administration and 
organisation”. (Rosenbloom, D.H and Kravchuk, R, S.2002:573). This perspective argues that accountabil
public organisation can be achieved through market mechanism and customers’ judgements. As Stoker (1998) 
argues the New Public Management (NPM) describes models of public service that reflect a ‘reinvented’ form of 
government which is better managed
bureaucratic model and attempts to transform the public sector through organizational reforms that focus on 
results in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, and quality of services. (Osborne 
Hughes 1998).  Peters and Pierre (1998:232) note that NPM “replace highly centralized, hierarchical structures 
with decentralized management environment where decisions on resource allocation and service delivery are 
made closer to the point of delivery”. Accordingly the objectives  of public choice theory for organizational 
performance  include; making public administration better through market like competition in provision of 
goods and services, increased  citizens value by
identification of mission, building accountability, Separating  service from control, expanding customer choice, 
Providing incentives, analyzing results and feedback.     
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As these “are a common response to common pressures
and the imperatives of globalization” (Polidano, 1999:2). Let us build upon this framework to discuss how public 
choice theory postulations can be circumvented in public serv
monetization of fringe in the public service.
 
3. Reform Ownership in Monetization of Fringe Benefits  
The Federal Government of Nigeria between 1999 and 2002 caused massive increment in recurrent expenditure 
as it rose from 499.67 billion naira to aggressive 696.78 billion naira in 2002(in other word from about 47.45% 
to 68.44%) (Bello 2004, AllAfrica.com).The sum is spent in procuring, maintaining and keeping state officials in 
affluent transportation, accommodation, medical services and so on. Although these amount was spent to 
improve the non- salary components of their wages and motivate workers to perform better, the outcome 
remained abysmal low productivity of public personnel.In sum the expected objectiv
minimum such negative fiscal challenges and in the stead, enhance efficiency in resources allocation in order to 
move the economy forward”. (Guardian, 2004:12).
accommodation, furniture allowance, utility allowance, medical allowance, leave grant, meal subsidy, domestic 
servants allowance, motor vehicle loan and  fuelling, Maintenance of official vehicles and transport allowance, 
meal subsidy and entertainment allowance.
Federal Ministry of Information and National Orientation .2004:18
Reform ownership is an important determinant for policy success. Its political economy hinges on 
achieving effective governance at the reduced cost through stabilization and adjustment. Johnson and Wasty 
(1993:2) describe ownership using a four dimensional variables; “locus of initiative; namely, who had the 
initiative in formulating and implementing the programme, the degree of coll
programme, and whether or not the funding for the programme was extended despite certain reservations of the 
authorities (disagreements and reluctance to implement some aspects of the programme). The second dimension 
is the level of intellectual conviction among key policymakers namely, the degree to which there was consensus 
among policymakers on the nature and causes of the problem, the choices open for its resolution, and the 
approach to be taken. The third dimension is the e
example, in up-front actions and public statements. The fourth dimension comprises efforts toward 
consensus-building among constituencies, for instance, by eliciting broad participation in th
and in launching a broad-based public campaign to elicit support for the programme outside the central 
government”. All these combine to achieve ‘national ownership’ which Klick et al (1998:87) describe as “when 
the political leadership and its advisers, with broad support among agencies of state and civil society, decide of 
their own volition that policy changes are desirable, choose what these changes should be and when they should 
be introduced, and where these changes become built int
generally accepted as desirable” 
On the strength of these explanations we note that monetization of fringe benefits has fallen short in part 
some of the requirements for attaining ownership in the reform 
which reveals, based on the report from the  Office of the Head of Civil Service of the Federation(2011)  that 
“the present Administration adopted the monetization programme following strong representations 
Revenue Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal Commission and after an intensive debate by the National nation 
devoting over 60% of its revenue to sustaining recurrent overheads, to the detriment of capital/infrastructural 
development” The administration referred is that of Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
 By this report it is glare that other relevant stakeholders such as employees (public personnel or 
servants),the labour, head of service, Ministries of Finance and Labour and Productiv
initiation of the reform agenda. This essentially is the “ownership gap” in the monetization of fringe benefits as 
the reform agenda. The negative outcome arising from this, is the concern of the next section.
3.1 The Implications of “ownership gap” in attaining the objectives of monetization
There are a set outcomes from “ownership gap” in the entire monetization process of fringe benefits in Nigeria’s 
public sector. The first is the culture of inconsistency and lack of uniform
This arose from battered political will exhibited by political leaders and conflicting assumptions in the theory 
and practice federalism among the federating units in Nigerian state. This essentially is a challenge in
process given that the background to reform ownership places political environment and commitment as 
apriority condition required for reform success. Obviously, many State governments and local Government 
councils in Nigeria have either not or 
with this is a reflection and perception of imposition by the public servants. It is a manifestation that 
governments of Nigeria is unable to get the true pictures of what it costs to 
public servant for a more realistic planning, budgeting and budget implementation.
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The second implication of ownership gap in the monetization policy is a reflection of assumptions of public 
choice theory that public servants are self serving. As a consequence, the government institutions are weakened 
and capacity to ensure compliance compromised. All these tilt to the fact that there is low macroecnomic 
improvement that can sustain market reforms in public service with
principles of market in a public sector developed along socialist ideals.Importantly, this gap therefore is a 
concomitant of a State where social services were earlier   provided free by government.
As a follow up,the third repercussion of ownership  is that the reform agenda has failed to enhance fiscal 
discipline which positively impact on the national value systems and ethics.By extension the weak institutional 
mechanism has unable to put corruption on check thereb
explains the growth in corrupt practices besides the improvement in corruption perception index of Nigeria from 
the rank of 143 out of 183 countries studied in 2011 . (Transprancy International  corruption 
report of 2011)  
(http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2007/gcb_2011 retrieved on 23/07/12
The analysis of monetization of fringe benefits within the lens of reform ownership further reviewed the 
weaknesses of total commitment in implementing this reform agenda since its introduction in 2002, as it lacks 
comprehensiveness in formulation and implementation. This hinged on the 
essential ingredient in reform success. The challenge of comprehensiveness also extends to the civil servants 
who ought to be properly consulted in the policy process bearing in mind that they are the custodian of public 
sector as well as the prime target benefactors.(see Guardian ,Wednesday ,July 
16,2003:15,Guardian ,Tuesday ,August 5,2003:3). Compliment to this is the assertion of Omema (2007:28) that, 
“in Nigeria, most reforms are talked about at the strategic rather tha
top know what the policy is actually trying to achieve. As such it is not out of context to say that the exercise is 
elitist, both in conception and implementation.This accounts for the emergence for the winner
thereby weakening  accountability process in the face of prevailing completion for individual gain. While 
personal satisfaction is cardinal to drive attainment of reform objectives, effective governance is desirable to 
avoid decadence in public service provisioning.
It is therefore as a matter of conclusion to recommend that both government and recipients need to reappraise the 
reform agenda to ensure total commitment towards eliminating private interest as a basis for public service 
delivery among public servant. To this extent the objectives of monetization should reflect the market attitude of 
private sector  both in form and operation to promote good governance in Nigeria.
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